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iT IS GOOD to have this opportunity to keynote
these seminars you will be attending for the next
few days. Before proceeding to what I have to say
about ‘The New, New Economics and Monetary
Policy,” let me place the two uses of the term “New”
in their proper perspective.
The expression “New Economics” has been ap-
plied to the body of economic theory popularly
called “Keynesian Economics.” This theory was set
forth by John Maynard Keynes in 1936 and has been
in vogue among economists since the 1940’s. Eco-
nomic policymakers in the l960’s have made great
use of the “New Economics” as guidance for their
actions.
The early followers of Keynes stressed the view
that chronic unemployment is a characteristic of our
economy. This view was consistent with the mass
unemployment of the 1930’s. The business fluctuations
which continued in the late 1940’s and 1950’s led
many followers of the New Economics to conclude
that our economy is basically unstable — subject to
shifts between periods of recession and inflation.
These two conclusions — that unemployment is a
chronic problem and that our economy is basically
unstable —. resulted in the proposition that vigorous
Government actions are necessary~ to promote high
level employment, economic growth, and relatively
stable prices. This proposition is embodied in the
spirit of the Employment Act of 1946.
This view was accepted by the President’s Council
of Economic Advisers from 1950 to 1968. The tax cut
of 1964 and the tax increase of 1968 are the hallmark
of the “New Economics.” The “New Economics” is a
combination of depression-oriented theories and ex-
pansionist objectives. Such a combination contains an
inherent inflationary bias which should be carefully
considered when it is applied to national economic
policy.
Let us now examine the other use of the word
“New.” The body of economic theory which we will
study in these seminars is not something new tacked
on to the basic analytical framework of the New
Economics. Instead, it is an up-dated version of the
economic theory which was dominant for many dec-
ades prior to what has been labeled the “Keynesian
Revolution.” The older economics held that our eco-
nomic system is inherently stable; hence, there was
little need for vigorous stabilization actions on the
part of Government. In fact, Government was viewed
as a source of economic instability. The expression
“New, New Economics” refers to a revival and elab-
oration of this pre-Keynesian body of economic
theory. This development has been accelerating dur-
ing the past few years because of the failures of
stabilization policy based on the major premises of
the New Economics.
I now turn to my main topic, “The New, New
Economics and Monetary Policy.0’ My remarks will
be built around three points: First, the two competing
views of monetary and fiscal actions in economic
stabilization are outlined, and evidence is presented
which, I believe, has led most of the economists
who will deliver presentations at these seminars to
assign great importance to monetary actions. Next,
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there is an examination of the slow response of
inflation to recent monetary restraint. Finally, the
problem of reducing the rate of inflation without a
great reduction in output of goods and services and
a marked increase in unemployment is considered.
Two Views of Monetary and Fiscal Actions
I will now contrast the two views of monetary and
fiscal actions. The basic premise of the “New, New
Economics” is that the Federal Reserve System,
through its control of the money stock, exercises a
pervasive influence on the course of total spending,
that is, gross national product, and thereby on prices.
On the other hand, Federal Government spending
and taxing actions, alone, are held to exert little net
influence on movements in GNP and prices.
For example, an increase in the rate of Government
spending at a time when the money stock remains
unchanged requires either of two methods of financ-
ing — taxing or borrowing from the public. In either
case, spending by the private sector is reduced by an
amount approximately equal to the rise in Federal
Government expenditures, resulting in little, if any,
change in the rate of overall spending in the economy.
However, if the Federal Reserve System makes it
possible for the banking system to acquire sufficient
Government debt to permit financing a rise in Gov-
ernment expenditures without taxing or borrowing
from the public, total spending will increase. In this
case, the money stock increases and is more properly
considered the cause of increased spending.
These observations regarding fiscal policy have
been recognized by both Keynesians and proponents
of the “New, New View,” except that Keynesians have
not assigned an important role to money. Unfortu-
nately, however, this point regarding fiscal actions
has received little recognition in the formulation of
stabilization policies or in recently constructed econo-
metric models of our economy from which many
policymakers obtain information. Instead, Govern-
ment spending and taxing have been considered
extremely powerful tools of economic stabifization,
regardless of the source of funds to finance a deficit
or of the disposition of a budget surplus. As a result,
fiscal policy in my opinion has been given too great
an emphasis and has had a misguiding influence in
monetary policy formulation. -
I now come to monetary actions — the point at
which the New, New Economics differs greatly from
the school of economic thought prevailing since the
mid-1930’s. Early Keynesians held that changes in the
money stock, unless accompanied by appropriate
- changes in Government spending, have little influence
on GNP. Monetary policy was assigned only a passive,
supporting role to fiscal policy. This view — that there
is little independent influence of monetary actions on
total spending — was widely accepted up to the mid-
1960’s and has played a dominant role in the formu-
lation of economic stabilization policies, even up to
now.
The New, New Economics directly challenges the
validity of this proposition. Historical evidence strong-
ly supports this challenge! Whenever growth of the
money stock indicates one direction of movement for
GNP and the Government’s budget another, the sub-
sequent course of GNP in virtually every case follows
that indicated by money. There arc two important
pieces of recent evidence supporting this monetary
view. One is the mini-recession experience following
the monetary restraint of 1966— when money re-
mained unchanged and the budget moved into greater
deficits. The other one is the failure of fiscal restraint
which began in mid-1968 — a time when money con-
tinued to increase at an excessive rate. Another piece
of evidence is provided by the Great Depression of
the 1930’s, when economic activity followed more
closely the course indicated by movements in the
money stock than the one indicated by the Govern-
ment’s budget.
This evidence, along with that provided by many
detailed studies, in my opinion demonstrates that
monetary actions measured by changes in the money
stock should receive the main emphasis in economic
stabilization. To ignore the influence of monetary
actions is to insure disruption of our normal, orderly
economic processes. History demonstrates that most
of our recessions and periods of inflation can be
attributed to perverse movements in the money stock.
For example, the Great Depression was marked by
an 8 per cent annual rate of decrease in money during
the four years after mid-1929.
Slow Response to Recent Monetary Restraint
I now turn to my second main point, the apparently
slowresponse of inflation to recent monetary restraint.
We have had an avowed policy of monetary restraint
/ for nearly a ye-ar, but there is only scattered evidence
at present that the overall pace of inflation has begun
to recede. Some have started to question whether
monetary restraint will prove to be as ineffective in
curbing the cunent inflation as did fiscal restraint in
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the past year and a half. Two things can account for
the slow response of inflation to the restrictive mone-
tary policy adopted last December.
First, only in the past six months has there been
what may be characterized as substantial monetary
restraint. The rate of monetary expansion was reduced
in two stages from the excessive 7 per cent annual
rate of 1967 and 1968, The rate of growth in the
money stock was reduced to about 5 per cent for
the first five months of this year, and since then
money has not increased. This latter development
is one which I would call substantial monetary
restraint.
Second, there is a considerable lag in the response
of the economy to a change in the rate of monetary
expansion. At the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank our
staff has conducted an extensive investigation to un-
cover the nature of this lag, using the New, New
Economics’ frame of reference. Although this research
is not quite fininshed, I would like to share with you
our findings up to now.’
This research indicates that, following a marked
decrease in the rate of growth in money, at least two
quarters are required for a noticeable reduction in
GNP growth. When total spending does finally slow,
growth of output of goods and services slows simul-
taneously, but at least an additional three quarters
are generally required for a marked reduction in the
rate of inflation to appear. We estimate that the entire
process of curbing inflation would normally require
about three years. Our research further indicates that
the process of fully curbing inflation is delayed still
longer when monetary restraint is implemented after
a period of prolonged and accelerating price advances.
This is the situation which currently confronts
efforts to reduce the rate of price increases. We have
now had an obvious and accelerating inflation for
about five years. As a result, many economic decisions
are based on expectations of continued inflation. For
example, union leaders seek higher wages in part to
protect workers’ earnings from continued inflation,
and business firms expect to be able to pay the higher
wages by being able to increase their prices. Also,
contracts to borrow funds take into consideration
expectations of future inflation, thereby adding an
inflation premium to market interest rates. Our re-
search indicates that on the average it may take about
five years of decelerating price increases to eliminate
most of the expectations of continued inflation.
1This research will be summarized in a forthcoming issue of
this Review.
Given the normal response of the economy to
slower growth in money, the entrenched expectations
of continued inflation, and the beginning of really
firm monetary restraint only six months ago, Ia mnot
disturbed that we have not yet seen a slowdown in
the rate of price increases. There is some evidence
of the slowing of growth of total spending and real
product in recent monthly statistics. Personal income
in September and October grew at only half the rate
of the previous year. Industrial production in the last
three months has declined at a 3 per cent annual
rate after increasing at a 5 per cent rate in the
previous year. Retail sales have been about un-
changed since last spring, and in real terms have of
course declined.
What has been accomplished thus far has been
setting of the stage for a reduction in the rate of
inflation. Consequently, at least the next three years
will be required to eliminate a significant portion of
this inflation. In response to recent monetary restraint,
assuming it is continued or relaxed only moderately,
we believe that gross national product and real output
have begun to grow at a slower pace. We believe that
there will be further marked slowing in 1970, and
that the rate of inflation will have been moderated
significantly by late 1971. But even at that point,
additional time will be required before we will have
reduced inflation below a two per cent rate. With
continuation of inflation for some time to come,
interest rates, because of the inflation premium men-
tioned earlier, are not likely to decrease much in the
near future.
If the results of this research into the nature of
the response of output and prices to monetary actions
are nearly correct, I have just outlined the extreme
problem that lies ahead. A high degree of moral,
economic, and political fortitude will be required if
we are to overcome the increasingly painful results
of the New Economics’ guidance of policy during the
last several years.
Curbing Inflation Without a Recession
I now come to my last main point, the problem
of curbing inflation without causing a recession. I
believe most economists will agree with the proposi-
tion I have just advanced — that whenever the rate
of growth in total spending decreases for several
quarters, real output of goods and services will also
grow at a reduced rate, while the rate of price in-
creases will respond only with a considerable lag.
Moreover, there is general agreement that, if total
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spending slows sufficiently, real output will actually
decrease and a recession develop. It is obvious that
in developing a strategy for curbing inflation, mone-
tary authorities face the difficult choice of balancing
a desire to avoid inordinate decreases in real output
against a desire to curb inflation in as short an
interval of time as possible. This choice is made more
difficult by the long time required to curb inflation,
regardless of whether or not a recession occurs, after
such a long period of inflation as we are currently
experiencing.
The present situation hears careful watching that
we not maintain the present degree of monetary
restraint too long. If we continue much longer to hold
the money stock at about its level of early last
summer, Ia mconcerned that the economy will ex-
perience an unnecessarily severe decrease in output
next year accompanied by high unemployment before
much progress is achieved in slowing inflation. The
recent research at our bank indicates that there is
little difference in our ability to reduce the rate of
inflation over the next three years if money were to
grow at a moderate 3 per cent rate from now than if
it were held unchanged for several months longer.
With a 3 per cent rate of growth in money beginning
soon, we would have a risk of a slight recession,
while if money remains unchanged much longer, real
output is likely to decrease at about a3per cent rate
next year. In either case, unemployment will rise,
but the extent and duration of higher unemployment
will be considerably less if a course of moderate
growth in money is now adopted.
If a substantial recession were to show signs of
developing as a result of an excessive duration of the
present level of restraint, Ia mconcerned that there
would develop public pressures to expand money
once again at such excessive rates as have prevailed
during much of the past five years. An examination
of the experience of 1967 and 1968 demonstrates the
results of such actions. After the money stock re-
mained unchanged for the last nine months of 1966,
the rate of total spending slowed during the first two
quarters of 1967, and real output declined slightly
in the first quarter of that year. I-loping to avoid
overkill, monetary authorities resumed money supply
growth at an excessive 7 per cent rate and, thus,
stimulated inflation further.
It was entirely proper that money growth should
have been resumed at that time; if it had remained
unchanged much longer, there would have been a
significant recession in 1967. We estimate that if
money growth had been resumed at a moderate
3 per cent rate — the rate which from 1961 to 1964
got the economy out of the previous recession — the
rate of inflation would have been about 2 per cent at
the present time, instead of the current rate of 5 to 6
per cent. Moreover, achievement of price stability
would have been virtually assured for next year. With
a slower rate of inflation, long-term interest rates
would have been about 2 percentage points lower
today. If we once again succumb to pressures for
excessive rates of monetary expansion, we will again
have lost the battle against inflation, as in 1967 and
1968.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am sorry that I cannot present to
you a view which maintains that inflation is fairly
easy to conquer within a year or so. We should
remember that our present inflation was pennitted
to develop at an accelerating rate over the past five
years. It is rather presumptuous to assume that this
trend can be reversed in a year or so, or that the
cooling-off of inflation can be achieved in a reason-
able time without a period of very slow growth in
output and higher unemployment. Overly optimistic
pronouncements of our ability to curb the present
inflation in a hurry and with only slight effects on
employment are a disservice to our people and a
stumbling block to the working of orderly corrective
processes.
I want to point out that in the 1950’s about 7 years
of restraint on spending and output were required to
eliminate the inflation which accompanied the Korean
War. Three recessions occurred during this period as
the result of stop-and-go monetary expansion which
alternated between periods of rapid growth and
decrease in money. Inflation has now been more in-
tense than in the 1950’s, making the problem even
more difficult, However, if moderate but persistent
monetary restraint is applied, avoiding the stop-and-
go policies of previous efforts to curb inflation, per-
haps inflation may be eliminated somewhat sooner
this time without subjecting the economy to wide
variations in output of goods and services and in
employment.
This does not mean that monetary actions cannot
produce the desired results. Instead, it means that all
segments of our society must have patience while
these actions are conducted, so as to permit the
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economy to achieve non-inflationary growth in out-
put of goods and services. Such growth, according to
the New, New Economics, will be at a rate deter-
mined by normal growth in the productive capacity
of our economy. Once we have achieved this goal,
monetary actions must he conducted in such a manner
as to assure that they will not be a source of future
economic instability.
Many individuals have become impatient at the
slow progress made in curbing inflation and have
been urging the imposition of price and wage controls.
Recently, there has been considerable support for
selective credit controls. Such measures, even if
cloaked with pseudo-respectability by being placed
on a voluntary basis for a brief period, are not part
of the New, New Economics. Instead, we believe
that the best way to cure our nation’s economic ills
is to allow stabilization efforts to \vork their influence
through our relatively free, competitive market system.
Moreover, experience during World War II and the
Korean War has demonstrated that treating only the
symptoms of inflation is neither effective nor desirable,
Also, reliance on such controls could very well lead
to their being substituted for appropriate overall
stabilization policy. Such was the experience with the
use of price-wage guidelines during the escalation
phase of the Vietnam War.
Finally, experience reinforces the belief held by
many that an inflationary trend should never be per-
mitted to start because of the great inequities it
creates and because of the long and arduous effort
which is required to conquer it. Some argue that
inflation is a small price to pay for a high level of
employment for all segments of our society. This may
be a basic tenet of the New Economics; but it is not
a tenet of the economic school of thought represented
at these seminars. The New, New Economics holds
that inflation is not required, and indeed is not a
long-run effective means, for our economy to grow
at its productive potential or for the achievement of a
high level of cmploynient.
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